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Abstract 
As a result of the economic reforms that began in 2003 in Nigeria, earning Nigeria a BB- credit rating, which led to 
US$18bn debt write-off and created pension funds which have several billions of Naira to be invested in Nigerian 
securities, investors confidence was ignited and lifted in Nigeria Stock Market. The banking sector reforms which 
necessitated recapitalization also fuelled a boom in the equity market. Most Nigerian bank stocks increased in value 
many folds, despite billions of Naira of new shares being issued, with some stocks more than quadrupling in value in 
less than a year between 2004 and 2007. Companies kept the free float of offers which were greatly matched by 
demand. The capital market thus became the haven for profit taking. From an all time high of N13.5 trillion market 
capitalization in March 2008 the stock prices experienced a free-for-all downward movement to generate less than 
N4.6 trillion market capitalization by the second week of January 2009 and N6.53 trillion as at last trading day of 
2011. With this downward movement regime,   more than 60% of slightly above 300 quoted securities were on 
constant offer (supply exceeding demand) on a continuous basis. Consequently many of the quoted stocks lack 
liquidity as their holders are trapped, not being able to convert them to cash to meet their domestic and other 
investment needs. Fresh investors became cautious of jumping into a vehicle that does not seem to have a brake 
should they wish to disembark. With exploratory research, the study discovered that the downturn was caused mainly 
by fears of contagion effects of the then rampaging global financial crisis. The consequences were legion as many 
investors lost heavily in terms of capital employed, confidence in the market and the capacity of pension funds to 
meet their obligations as they become due. The panacea lies in restructuring the toxic assets generated by the 
downturn into marketable instruments, to give a fresh start to the affected firms.  
Introduction 
The first trading day of 2008 which was Wednesday demonstrated bullishness in the Nigeria stock market. The 
All-Share Index (ASI) of the Exchange rose by 589.55 points or 1.02 percent from 57,990.22 points at which it 
closed in the last trading day of 2007 to close at 58,579.77 points. Market capitalization rose by N100 billion or one 
percent to N10.3 trillion. At the end of January 2008, the ASI closed at 57,845.50 and market capitalization also 
closed lower at N10.51 trillion. In February, the market was very bullish. The All-Share Index recorded an historic 
highest on Friday February 22, closing at 64,128.69, while market capitalization stood at 12.30 trillion. Nevertheless 
the month of March witnessed a reversal. Bears got hold of the market and equity prices began to fall. In the first 
week of the month, though, the ASI rose to 66,121.93 and market capitalization went to N12.6 trillion, in the second 
week, ASI went down to 65,005, and market capitalization fell to N12.4 trillion. By March ending, the ASI dipped to 
63,147.04. In April, bears started reigning massively in the market. The prices of equities began the free crash and 
the ASI fell to 60,339.68 and market capitalization was down at N11.68 trillion. As at end of May 2008, the ASI 
slightly went up to 60,570.30 and market capitalization to N11.93 trillion. In June, the ASI closed lower at 54,905.36 
and market capitalization also closed lower at N10.72 trillion. During the month of July, bears reigned supreme and 
the ASI closed lower at 50,422.78, while the market capitalization went down to N10.10 trillion. In the month of 
August, the ASI and market capitalization dropped to 47,789.20 and N9.74 trillion respectively. Though the ASI 
further plummeted to 46,216.13 but market capitalization went up marginally to N9.84 trillion in September. In 
October, price movement went for a free fall following the removal of the restriction of one percent maximum 
downward movement of share prices, which was introduced by the NSE as a solution to persistent fall of equities’ 
prices. The ASI stood at 36,325.86 while market capitalization remained at N7.96 trillion. As at November, the ASI 
opened at 36,352.86 points, falling to 33,754.11 points on November 5. Between November 6 and 17 it had a highest 
figure of 38,018.44, but fell on November 28 to close at 33,025.75. The decline was propelled by the actions of profit 
takers who disposed stocks in order to reap off quick gains. 
On Tuesday, December 16, market capitalization closed at N6.21 trillion while the ASI stood at 28,085.01. The 
market suddenly took an upward movement on Wednesday December 17, when it closed at N6.28 trillion, while the 
ASI was 28,390.83. On Thursday, December 18, market capitalization stood at N6.4 trillion, while the ASI stood at 
28,985.70. By Friday, December 19, 2008, the market capitalization has risen to N6.54 trillion, while the ASI stood 
at 29,551.84. Suddenly, the stock market staged a rebound and recovery recording gains, both in volume traded and 
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most especially, by price appreciation. During the period – January to December 19, 2008, All-Share-Index fell from 
an unprecedented high of 66,121.93 in the first week of March to 29,551.84 shedding 36,570.89 or 48.1 percent, 
while market capitalization went down from N12.6 trillion in the same period to N6.54 trillion, losing N6.06 trillion 
in ten months. What accounted for these downward slides in the capital market indices is still somehow shrouded in 
mystery. The aim of this study is to unmask the causes, the consequences and the possible workable solutions to the 
problem. 
Review of Previous Studies 
Stock market behaviour has figured prominently in the development of modern theories of what determines the 
market price and value of securities. The modern theories regarding the valuation of stocks and other securities are 
the fundamentalists, the Technicalists (or Chartists), the Random Walkists, and the efficient market hypothesis. The 
fundamentalists use economic, financial and political news to determine why, when, and where prices will move in 
the market. It entails the examination of historical information that caused price movements in the past on each stock 
and using the analysis to forecast what will happen currently in the market. The fundamental analysis deals more 
with the WHY of price movements. The technicalists or Chartists focus on the study of stocks past price and volume 
placed on charts to predict future price movements, based on the stocks’ past price pattern and trends. The analysis 
focuses on the formation of charts and formulae to capture major and minor trends, identify buying and selling 
opportunities and assessing the extent of market turnarounds. Depending upon the time horizon, one could use 
technical analysis on an intra-day basis (i.e. a minute, 15 minute, hourly), weekly or monthly basis. The Technical 
analysis deals more with the WHEN of price movements. Some tools used for technical analysis include stochastic 
indicators, moving averages and ratios. The Chartists believe that the past price behaviour of a security tend to recur 
in the future. For this reason careful analysis of stock price averages and the price of individual shares reveal 
important data concerning future price movements. But studies by Fisher (1961), Fama (1965) and others show that 
changes in stock prices are not significantly related to past price changes. Another test performed on the technical 
analysis theory has been to try various mechanical trading or filter, rules to see if the investor is better off using these 
rules instead of a simple “buy and hold” strategy. Filter rules usually require the investor to buy if a security’s price 
goes up at least Y percent and sell when the security’s price declines by X percent or more.  Random Walk is a term 
used in mathematics and statistics to describe a process in which successive elements in a data series are independent 
of each other and therefore are essentially random and unpredictable. The theory of random walk as applied to stock 
price changes says that the price movements of stocks act as though they were independent random drawings from 
an infinite pool of possible outcomes. Each stock is assumed to have an intrinsic value based on investors’ 
expectations of the discounted value of future cash flows generated by that stock. The market price per share is an 
unbiased estimator of a stock’s intrinsic value and reflects the latest information available concerning the issuing 
company’s condition and future prospects. Successive changes in the price of a stock are random fluctuations around 
that stock’s intrinsic value, and these changes that occurred in the past. Therefore it is not possible to predict the 
stock price.  
 
A broader theory of stock price movements is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) as spearheaded by Fama 
(1970), supported by Patell and Wolfson (1984), Seyhun (1986), Gosnell, Keown and Pinkerton (1996). A market is 
efficient if scarce resources are allocated to their most productive uses. A securities market is efficient if current 
security prices reflect all information about each security and quickly adjust to all available information. Therefore 
an efficient market is one where security current prices adjust rapidly to all available information. Security prices 
adjust instantaneously to new information and a new set of intrinsic values results, leading some investors to adjust 
their portfolios. All of this happens instantaneously so that market price always equals intrinsic value in a state of 
continuous equilibrium. Financial analysts with extraordinary ability to uncover new information may achieve 
above-average rate of return, at least for short periods of time. In an efficient market, the form of efficiency may be 
weak, semi-strong or strong. Weak form is a situation where information on past share price movements is only 
available. That is current stock prices fully reflect all historical data about the securities. The historical data include 
past sequence of prices, past rates of return, past trading volume etc. The market efficiency is weak because past 
rates of return and other past market information may have no relationship with future rates of return. That is there is 
little or no gain buying or selling based on past rates or data. Semi-strong form is a situation where information on 
past share price movements and published information relevant to each company are available. That is current stock 
prices fully reflect historical data and publicly available information. Public information includes earnings, stock 
splits, dividend announcements, P/E ratio, economic and political news etc. Investor who based their decisions on 
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new information after it has been made public cannot derive above average return because prices already reflect such 
information. Strong form is a situation where all interesting information be it historical data, public information and 
information available to privileged parties are generally available. That is, current stock prices fully reflect historical 
data, public information and privileged information. Information is cost-free and available to all at the same time. 
Since nobody has monopoly of information’s relevant for price formation no group is able to consistently derive 
above average profit in a strong efficient market.  Pareto efficiency states that the status quo cannot be changed 
without making someone worse off. 
 
The EMH became controversial when some anomalies were detected in the stock market. Those who made the 
findings and their findings are as follows: Rozett and Kinney (1976), using New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks, documented stocks prices for the period 1904-1974 and discovered that on the average, the return for the 
month of January was 3.48% compared to 0.42% for the other months. Later studies carried out by Bhardwaj and 
Brooks (1992) for 1977-1986 periods, Reinganum (1983) for 1961-1990 periods, also identified the same market 
anomaly which is termed “January effect”. French (1980) analyzed the daily stocks returns for the period 
1953-1977, and finds that there is tendency for returns to be negative on Mondays whereas they are positive on the 
other days of the week. He notes that these negative returns are caused only by the weekend effect and not by a 
general closed market effect. Therefore, he suggests that for a trading to be profitable in this situation, one should 
adopt the strategy of buying stocks on Mondays and selling them on Friday. Agrawal and Tandon (1994) find 
significantly negative returns on Monday in nine countries and on Tuesday in eight countries, yet large and positive 
returns on Friday in 17 of the 18 countries studied, up to 1987. Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) also documented the 
same effect. They termed this scenario ‘Weekend effect’ or Monday effect. 
Cadsby and Ratner (1992) came up with evidence from USA, UK, France, and Japan to show that stock returns are 
significantly higher at the last and first day of the month. Haugen and Lakonishok (1989) assert that US stock returns 
are significantly higher on the last and first three trading days of the month. Ariel (1987) finds that stock returns are 
higher on the last day of the month they termed this scenario “turn of the month effect”. Ariel (1990), Cadsby and 
Ratner (1992), and Brockman and Michayluk (1998) documented a “pre-holiday effect” where on the average stock 
returns are higher the day before a holiday than on other trading days. Apart from the calendar effects, Banz (1981) 
supported by Reinganum (1983) in his analysis of 1936–1975 period reveals that excess returns would have been 
earned by holding the stocks of low capitalization companies otherwise called the “small size firms” Reinganum 
(1983) provide evidence that the risk adjusted annual return of small firms were greater than 20%. This is termed 
“small-size firm effect”. Fama and French (1995) find that market and size factors in earnings help explain market 
and size factors in returns. Basu (1977) opines that stocks of low P/E companies earned a premium for investors 
during 1957-1971 period and an investor who held the low P/E ratio portfolio earned higher returns than an investor 
who held the entire sample of stocks. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) document that short-sellers position 
themselves in stocks of firms with low P/E ratios since they are known to have commensurate future returns in terms 
of dividend income and price appreciation. Debondt and Thaler (1985,1987) present evidence that is consistent with 
the fact that stock prices overreact to changes in current earnings. They report positive estimated abnormal stock 
returns for portfolios that previously generally inferior earnings performance. This line of thought generates 
“over/under reaction of stock prices to earnings announcement”. 
Harris and Gurel (1986), find a surprising increase in share prices (up to 3%) on the announcement of a stock’s 
inclusion into the S&P 500 index and this they called the “S&P index effect”. The influence of phenomena such as 
snow, rain, sunshine, cloudy weather which put people in different moods, choices and judgements as discovered in 
NYSE (Hirshleifer and Shumay 2001) creates anomalies which cannot be explained within the existing paradigm of 
EMH, Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) propounds that information is instantaneously reflected in stock prices. 
This clearly suggests that information alone is not moving the stock prices. Hirshleifer and Shumay (2001) find that 
stock market daily stock returns are positively correlated with sunshine in almost all the 26 countries they analysed 
their data from 1982-1997. This they termed the “weather effect”. Keynes (1936) views stock market as a “Casino” 
guided by “animal spirit” of investors with short-run speculative motives, who are disinterested in assessing the 
present value of future dividends or holding on investment for a significant period but rather interested in estimating 
the short-run price movements. As a result, shareholders are increasingly concerned with short term gains and have 
very short-term planning horizons. EMH and Keynes have two extreme views of the stock market. EMH is flawed 
on the ground that it is not guided by a complete knowledge of factors governing the decision. It fails to provide a 
realistic framework for the formation of expectations, given the uncertainly factor, Keynes is of the opinion that, to 
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make a rational decision would involve knowledge of future income flows, the appropriate discount rate, both of 
which are unknowable. And this creates insufficient knowledge for one to make forecast of investment yields. He 
submits that the future is uncertain and can never be determined, while EMH maintains that in the real world the 
investors are only faced with risk and not uncertainty. To drive his point home, Keynes came up with an analogy. In 
his analogy he likened the stock market to a beauty contest where the goal of any investor is to pick the girl that 
others would consider prettiest rather than choosing the one he/she thinks is prettiest. Hence the individual tends to 
conform to the behaviour of the majority. And what may be irrational at the individual level now becomes rational or 
the convention in Keynesian analysis. 
On the Volatility tests, the examination of share price movements with respect to the movements in the fundamental 
variables, in order to ascertain the rationality of market behaviour is called the volatility tests. The first two studies 
applying these tests were by Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981) and these spawned a series of articles. Shiller 
tests a model in which stock prices are the present discounted value of future dividends. LeRoy and Porter use a 
similar analysis for the bond market. These studies reveal significant volatility in both the stock and bond markets. 
Shiller suggests that if fluctuations in actual prices are greater than those implied by changes in the fundamental 
variables affecting the prices the difference comes as a result of fads (i.e. waves of optimistic or pessimistic market 
psychology). Schwert (1989) tested for a relation between stocks return volatility and economic activity. He finds 
increased volatility in financial asset returns during recessions, which might suggest that operating leverage increases 
during recessions. He also finds increased volatility in period where the proportion of new debt issues to new equity 
issues is more than a firm’s existing capital structure. This may be interpreted as evidence of financial leverage 
affecting volatility. These results of excess volatility in the stock market have been confirmed by Cochrane (1991), 
West (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985). However the tests have been 
criticized, largely on methodological grounds by Marsh and Merton (1987). 
Shleifer and Summers (1990:23-26) posit that there are two types of investors in the market – namely the rational 
speculators or arbitrageurs who trade on the basis of information and noise traders who trade on the basis of 
imperfect information. The imperfect information cause prices to deviate from their equilibrium. The imperfect 
information cause prices to deviate from their equilibrium values, whiles arbitragers play the crucial role of 
stabilizing prices by diluting such shifts in prices. They assert that perfect arbitrage under EMH is unrealistic as a 
result of fundamental risk and unpredictable future resale price. Given the limited arbitrage they argue that security 
prices do not merely respond to information but also to changes in expectations or sentiments which are not fully 
justified information. Investors’ trading strategies such is trend chasing, tracking possible indicators of demand 
which constitute “noise” rather than rational evaluation of information make no sense if prices respond only to 
fundamental news and not to investor demand. But they make perfect sense in a world where investor sentiments 
move prices and so predicting changes in this sentiment pays. Black (1986) argues that noise traders play a useful 
role in promoting transactions and thus influencing prices and informed traders like to trade with noise traders who 
provide liquidity. Therefore so long as risk is rewarded and there is limited arbitrage it is unlikely that market forces 
would eliminate noise traders and maintain efficient prices. 
On models of human behaviour that effect market behaviour, there were attempts to explain the persistence of 
anomalies rooted in human and social psychology. On this note, it is a well known fact that individuals have limited 
information processing capacity, exhibit systematic bias in information processing, are prone to make mistakes, are 
adjusting to rely on the opinion of others. Kahneman and Tversky (1986) argue that when faced with the complex 
task of assigning probabilities to uncertain outcomes individuals often tend to use cognitive heuristics, which often 
lead to systematic biases. Rabin and Thaler (2001) showed that the failure of expected utility theory of risk aversion 
is due to its failure to recognize the psychological principles underlining decision tasks. Shiller (1981) attributes the 
movements in stock prices to social movements and suggests that the final opinion of individual investors may 
largely reflect the opinion of a larger group. This type of “follow the crowd or social fads” approach is bound to 
cause excessive volatility in the stock market, with very little rational or logical explanation. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) assert that custom, language, and culture influence stock trades.  Huberman and Regeve (2001) posit that 
how and not when information is released can cause stock price reactions. They exemplify this with the news about a 
firm which developed a cure for cancer. Although the news (information) had been published a few months earlier in 
multiple media outlets, the stock price more than quadruple the day after receiving public attention in the New York 
Times. Although there was no new information presented, the form in which it was presented caused a permanent 
price rise. 
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It is obvious that the EMH has stimulated a plethora of studies that looked among other things, at the reaction of the 
stock market to the announcement of various events such as earnings(Ball and Brown 1968), stock splits(Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll 1969), capital expenditure(McConnell and Muscrella 1985), divestitures(Klein 1986), and 
takeovers (Jensen and Ruback 1983). The usefulness or relevance of the information was judged based on the market 
activity associated with a particular event. Most of the EMH researches in the seventies focused on predicting prices 
from past prices while those of the eighties and nineties looked critically at the possibility of forecasting prices based 
on variables such as dividend yield(Fama and French 1995), P/E ratios(Campbell and Shiller 1988), term structure 
variables(Harvery 1991), and the inadequacies of the CAPM(Cutter et al 1989: Haugen and Baker 1996). 
Researchers repeatedly challenged the studies based on EMH by raising critical questions such as: Can the 
movement in stock prices by fully attributed to the announcement of events? Do public announcements affect prices 
at all? And what could be some other factors affecting price movements? Cutter, Poterba and Summers (1989) argue 
that most price movements for individual stocks cannot be traced to public announcements. Haugen and Baker 
(1996), in their analysis of determinants or returns in US, UK, Japan, France, Germany conclude that none of the 
factors related to sensitivities of macroeconomic variables seem to be important determinants of expected stock 
returns. The EMH contributed immensely to the understanding of the securities market but there were growing 
discontentment with the hypothesis. Presently in Nigeria, the stock market is subject to waves of optimistic and 
pessimistic sentiments even when no objective evidence exists for such sentiment, and stock price movements are 
caused largely by changes in the perception of ignorant speculators, tinted with a significant degree of order and 
coherence infused by the institutional and social structures. Therefore, with the exposure to the above propositions 
by experts, what actually accounted for the crash of Nigerian Stock market? 
3.0 Research Methodology 
To achieve the purpose of the study, a mixture of archival and survey study was adopted. This necessitated pursuing 
investors (both institutional and private individual), regulators, broking houses with questions to find out what 
actually caused the problem. These problems generated some discoveries that we shall see below. 
4.0 Findings and Discussions 
The global financial crisis really started to show its effects in the middle of 2007 and all through 2008 and continued 
unabated. The Crisis started in the U.S (due to certain laxities in the US financial and regulatory system), spread to 
Europe, and later became global. The collapse of the USA sub-prime mortgage market and the reversal of the 
housing boom in other industrialized economies had a ripple effect around the world. Furthermore, other weaknesses 
in the global financial system surfaced. Some financial products and instruments became so complex and twisted, 
that as things started to unravel, trust in the whole system started to wane. The extent of the problems has been so 
severe that some of the world’s largest financial institutions have collapsed, AIG, the USA insurance giant being an 
example. Even countries not affected by the financial crisis were later affected by ‘second-round effects’ as the crisis 
became more fundamentally economic. Around the world, stock markets fell, large financial institutions collapsed or 
bought out, and governments in even the wealthiest nations had to come up with sizeable rescue packages to bail out 
their financial systems. According to the World Bank, the depth of the recession was difficult to gauge. Should credit 
markets remain frozen and asset prices continue to fall, then the decline in output over the future years could be 
extreme. However, the extraordinary measures taken by fiscal and monetary authorities were expected to eventually 
restore confidence so that banks will no longer hoard cash, and businesses can obtain the credit essential for normal 
operations. 
 
4.1 What Went Wrong 
Global financial crisis: That the world is indeed a global village and the world economies interrelated is very evident 
in the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. During this crisis, many stock markets of countries, from USA to Europe 
United Kingdom to France, from Asia China to Japan, Russia, and others were in serious trouble. Because of this 
interrelatedness, any development in any part of the world affects other parts as well. Consequently, the Nigerian 
capital market was not insulated from this global malignant cancer. The upward trend in the stock market which 
resulted in the market capitalization peaking at an all-time high of N13.5 trillion in March, 2008 was slowed down 
by massive decline in the global economy to less than N4.6 trillion by the second week of January 2009. The shrink 
in the foreign economies orchestrated capital flight from the Nigerian capital market as most foreign investors sought 
to make up for the deficits in their home countries. The pull-out of many foreign investors that already have troubles 
in their home economies from the Nigerian stock market led to the dumping of shares beyond the ability of domestic 
investors to contain. In consequence of this, supply of equities overwhelmed demand which led to price fall.  
Developing Country Studies                                                                                   www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.9, 2012  
 
110 
Political Upheavals in African Continent: The ongoing political turmoil in some North African countries affected 
trading activities on the NSE as major indicators recorded a significant decline as the war escalated. At January 25, 
2011, market cap was N8.885trillion. On Wednesday (23/2/2011) market cap lost 0.1% (or N11billion) to close at 
N8.538trillion while on Thursday (24/2/2011) market cap lost 1.9% (or N158billion) to close at N8.380trillion. The 
NSE ASI fell in the same rate. These losses were traced to the unrest in some African countries and Middle East like 
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Bahrain, Libya, Iran, Jordan and Yemen. The fresh round of withdrawals of funds by 
foreign investors, who account for a large proportion of investments in the Nigerian capital market accounted for the 
losses. There were sell-offs as a result of panic by foreign investors because of the crisis. These foreign investors see 
Africa as a continent and afraid that Nigeria can be affected in one way or the other. 
 
Pronouncements by Regulatory Bodies: Recent pronouncement by IMF as at Thursday (24/2/2011) that the CBN 
might need to increase benchmark interest rates further and weaken the domestic currency to curb inflation, 
following increase in public spending is another reason for the decline recorded in capital market indices. As a result 
foreign investors became jittery that if the CBN decides to devalue Naira, they would lose some of their investments 
hence their mass exit from the market. The apex regulator of the Nigerian stock market, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, prior to the crash of the market had alleged publicly that stock market prices were being manipulated 
and it announced that it was probing some quoted companies, such as Dunlop Nig. Plc, Eternal Oil Plc, Capital Oil 
Plc, and so on. Following the publication, investors became afraid that such statements coming from the principal 
regulator evidenced the existence of unrealistic prices of all stocks, thus provoking panic selling of stocks among 
investors. This contributed to the crash of the market. Unfortunately till date, not much has been heard of the 
outcome of the SEC investigation that transmitted shockwaves down the spines of investors. 
 
Exorbitant operating cost: Unarguably the cost of doing business in Nigeria is high. Inadequacy of basic 
Infrastructures like good roads, power supply, water supply, security of lives and property among others are lacking, 
leading to high cost of doing business. Many companies like Dunlop Nigeria plc and Michelin Nigeria have closed 
down their production plants as a result of exorbitant operating costs. Most of the textile industries have also stopped 
production, leading to the crash of their share prices. The shares of some of the companies now trade at nominal 
value of 50kobo per share. Therefore, evidently, high operating costs impact negatively on the share prices. 
 
Enforced regulations: The influx of capital flow in the capital market can be traced to some previously enforced 
regulations. For example, on July 6, 2004 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandated all banks to meet a minimum 
bank capital base of N25billion from the N2billion subsisting previously. Following the forced capitalization of 
banks to a minimum of N25billion, almost all banks utilized the capital market to raise funds. The banks that 
competed to recapitalize not only sucked liquidity from the Nigerian financial system but also overheated it. Through 
enticing marketing strategies, the banks succeeded in their various offers, but left the capital market place bleeding 
and gasping for breath. The primary market seemed to experience a boom while the secondary market was sucked 
dry as many investors dumped their shares in the secondary market, in favour of the primary market offers. Total of 
N2.2 trillion was raised through various public offers dominated by the banks in 2008. Much of this came through 
disposal of shares in the secondary market. Similarly, in the insurance industry, directives issued in 2006 that a 
minimum of N1bn capital base was expected also generated the same effect as that of the Banking sector.  
Offers by Private Placement: The Director-General of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke in 2008 
admitted this fact in her review of the performance of the Nigerian capital market when she observed inter alia that a 
significant portion of funds that left the stock for private placement market are still locked-in as many of the issues 
have not applied to the Nigerian Stock Exchange for Listing. A number of private companies floated private 
placement of their shares at lower prices while they sought or intended to seek quotation of their share at higher 
values on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, thus making such private placements very attractive. This lured investors to 
dispose off their shares in the secondary market, purchase the private placement and dispose of same immediately 
after their listing on the Stock Exchange at higher prices. The Nigerian capital market thus became a battleground as 
private companies were falling on each other through many of such offers. The regulating bodies were impotent as 
the investment and securities Act, 2007, does not place private companies and their private placements under their 
control. A number of companies that did private placement to suck liquidity from the Nigerian capital market, 
include: Tantalizers, Investment and Allied Plc, Globe Reinsurance Plc, Multiverse Ltd, Swap Technologies Ltd, 
Starcomms Ltd, Equity Assurance Plc, Oasis Assurance Plc, HIS Ltd, Indomie Nigeria Ltd, Tetrazzini Ltd, Food 
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Concepts Ltd, Geolfluied Ltd, Goldlink Insurance Ltd, Universal Insurance Ltd, Chams Plc, Fidson Health Care Plc, 
Reltel Wireless Ltd, MTN Ltd, among others. Thus so much liquidity was sucked from the Nigerian capital market in 
favour of private placements of private companies, many of which remain unquoted till date, leading to the lack of 
funds to trade in the secondary capital market. 
 
Unwholesome practices: It is worth recalling that as the market revelled in boom, unwholesome practices among 
which include deceptive price manipulation by banks in subtle agreement with stockbrokers, and sharp practices of 
some investors, stirred imbalance in the system. Stock prices were greatly overvalued and investors were 
hoodwinked by the deceptive allurements for profits. This trend was further accentuated and sustained by margin 
facilities from the newly capitalized banks. Thus with the withdrawal of margin facilities came a reversal to bearish 
market sometime around April 2008. The bearish trend deepened for seven months with a temporary market bottom 
out in November, when market capitalization hit N7.4 trillion. As at December 2008, the market has lost over N6 
trillion in total cumulative losses. 
Exit of foreign portfolio investors: The recession in the United States, Europe and Asia is a paramount setback for 
the Nigerian capital market. Each of these countries is strongly attempting to make up for their deficits. Besides, the 
unprecedented losses sustained have greatly threatened some hedge fund managers’ confidence in the Nigerian 
capital market. Since the underlying motive for investments include profit, or at least in the minimum, breaking even, 
huge losses only erode investor confidence. And in situations where some other countries capital markets were 
attractive and pose considerably less risk, the NSE needs a far more reaching technique to attract foreign investors on 
one part, and ensure that their confidence is met. The crisis of confidence has been ravaging the Nigerian capital 
market up to date.  
Availability of Alternative Investments: Another factor that is of great threat to the stock market is the availability of 
other reliable investment frontiers. For instance, investors are being propelled by the huge profits being derived from 
the real estate market. The current demand for housing units in the Nigerian market indicates a point for profit taking 
assurance. The situation where rents are measured in foreign currencies, and payments in two years upfront, coupled 
with other charges, are alluring. 
Short-term Speculative Activities: Between 2006 and 2008 the Nigerian capital market was seen by investors as a 
market for short term investments. Investors embarked on unguarded short term treasure hunting spree from the 
capital market. At a time, many individual investors abandoned or sidelined their core lines of business and 
concentrated on short-term speculative activities of buying and selling equity securities in Nigerian capital market. 
Even banks were financing about 65% of the Nigerian capital market transactions through margin facilities granted 
to investors and stock broking firms. Many banks abandoned or sidelined their core operation of providing credit to 
the real sector in favour of “playing” the capital market for short-term speculative activities that seemed to pay off up 
to March 2008 before the cancer that afflicted the market set in. It is estimated that the total exposure of banks to the 
capital market in terms of trapped funds was in excess of N1 trillion. Following the trapped banks’ funds, the banks 
became violent on the investors and stock broking firms who borrowed from them for share acquisition. This 
approach brought suicidal pressure to bear on these borrowers, compelling them to sell their shares at any price just 
to have a moment of respite. This further increased the supply of shares at ridiculous prices, leading to greater market 
crash. Thus, the capital market became overheated with so much speculative activities of banks and other 
institutional investors that by the time the market caved in, it became very difficult for them to exit through the 
narrow door as there were no large numbers of financially buoyant investors to buy the stocks from them.  
  
Borrowings from foreign banks: The Nigerian banks usually get short-term loans from foreign banks. They come 
home, sell the foreign currency at the auction market or lend it to traders in consumables at exorbitant interest rates 
and make good profit. With this, they declare huge profit every day. The value of their shares goes up accordingly. 
With the emergence of global financial crisis the credit lines dried up with the related profit hence the low value of 
their shares. The value of the shares of the rest 40% members of the Stock Exchange which are non-financial 
institutions and do not trade in this manner remains relatively stable compared to gyrations in the prices of banking 
stocks. This is an eye opener that it is time our financial institutions learn to have a home-based capital market that 
will not be vulnerable to any adverse fluctuation in foreign financial markets. They should not let their operation 
depend heavily on foreign borrowing. 
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The Consequences  
Collaborating with the views of Olisaemeka (2009) on the negative impacts of the Nigerian capital market meltdown 
on investment horizon, the following are some of the negative effects of the downturn. 
Loss of confidence in the Nigeria economy: There was loss of confidence in the Nigeria economy, as many investors 
prefer to convert their naira to foreign currencies, especially the dollar and held them through their domiciliary 
accounts or in their personal piggy-banks. This in part encouraged worsening exchange rate against the naira and 
starved the stock market of transaction funds. 
Credit crunch in the economy: The market meltdown fuelled credit crunch in the economy as banks do not have 
enough funds to lend to the productive sectors leading to high interest rate. Given the high interest rate, cost of fund 
to manufacturers became very significant component of production cost, thus translating to higher prices of goods 
and services thereby causing high inflation. Thus, the productive sectors are crowded out of credit facilities and their 
share prices are crumbling. 
 
Loss of confidence on shares as collateral: The meltdown led to the loss of confidence of banks and other lenders on 
shares as collateral for loan facilities. Shares which were before the crisis readily accepted by banks as collateral are 
now shunned by them. The few of them that dare to touch them for this purpose only do so at ridiculous discounts as 
some of them seek up to 300% cover. 
 
Loss of depositors’ funds with the banks: The market meltdown led to loss of shareholders’ and depositors funds 
with the banks and significantly increased the quantum of banks non-performing assets. The market meltdown also 
induced massive withdrawal of foreign investors from the Nigerian financial system, dampening the remaining 
source of hope for possible market recovery. 
 
Depletion of Pension Fund Asset: Following the passage of the Pension Reform Act, 2004, Pension assets are now 
privately managed. Under the Act, every employer, whether in the private or in the public sector is obligated to 
deduct 7.5% of every employees/emolument, then add another 7.5% totalling 15%. This is remitted on monthly basis 
to a Pension Fund Administrator (PFA) under the superintendence of a Pension Fund Custodian (PFC). The PFAs 
manage the pension assets by investing in a variety of instruments including equities. Currently there is massive 
reduction in the value of investment assets held by the PFAs and PFCs as a result of the capital market meltdown. 
The Pension Act of 2004 makes it mandatory for pension fund managers to invest 35 percent of the funds in the 
NSE. However, the terms of the Act is stiff as only 25 of the more than 300 companies listed in the NSE are 
qualified to attract pension fund. Based on this limitation, it will be of little or very much insignificant effect for 
these pension fund manager to cause a reasonable up-shake to herald a market boom in 2009. 
 
Financial Incapacity of Stockbrokers: The Stockbrokers are financially incapacitated and unable to settle their clients 
for securities sold. With the meltdown, many stock broking firms cannot discharge their obligation to their clients. 
Proceed of shares sold by these stockbrokers for their clients are greedily seized by the banks to which the stock 
broking firms owe billions of naira through margin accounts. Incoming credits or debits arising from sale of 
securities or purchase of securities can only be settled through the appointed settlement banks. This gives the banks 
the opportunities to get at stockbrokers. Thus many stock broking firms rejects sale order as they know that the banks 
will seize the credits, leading them to contend with their clients. 
 
Loss of Confidence on the regulatory bodies – There has been massive erosion of investors’ confidence on the 
regulatory bodies of the stock market such as the Nigeria Stock Exchange as well as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission whose regulatory impotence has been largely blamed for the present woes of the capital market and 
whose principal officers appears to have exhausted all they know and all they can offer to change the fortunes of the 
market. Many market analysts believe that they ought to have thrown in the towel instead of trying to stay put and 
superintend the “funeral mass” of the market as they have nothing again to offer. 
 
Unstable Macro-Economic Environment: The macroeconomic environment in Nigeria has remained unstable and 
unpredictable for several years arising from the incessant and often violent changes in the machinery of government 
of the economy. The consequences of such unstable economic environment have been high inflation, foreign 
exchange rate depreciation, loss in the value of returns on investment among others. 
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Poor System of Supervision and regulation: The system of prudential regulation and supervision remains 
rather poor, such that the freedom of financial information is often impeded. In the Nigeria capital market, 
complaints from operators have revolved around manipulation of share prices by stockbrokers, share purchase 
without fund to back it up, share dealing without client’s mandate, the appropriation of part or all the proceeds 
of issues by issuing houses to offset bridging loans, non-remittance of share proceeds to the selling clients, 
buy-hold syndrome. Nigerians still operate their investment portfolios like real estate as something for keeps 
for posterity.  
 
The Panacea 
Means of Correction: In the third quarter of 2008, the turmoil in the capital market attracted several policy reviews 
and enforcement of regulations, principally for the control of the continuous market decline. Disturbed by the 
tumbling prices of stocks and bonds, government and key stakeholders sought ways to halt investors’ dwindling 
fortunes in the equities market. In a meeting on August 28, in Abuja, the Federal Government and Stakeholders in 
the Nigerian capital market resolved to adopt measures to checkmate the bearish trend in the market. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Nigeria Stock Exchange took strategic 
decisions. For SEC, it reduced its fees by 50 percent, while rules on share buyback were released. However, a 20 
percent limit was placed on the total shares that a public company could buy back in line with the provision of 
CAMA. Next, it went further to release the guidelines for market makers on the Nigerian stock exchange. On the part 
of the CBN, progressive steps for liquidity ease included reduction of Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) from 10.2 
percent to 9.75 percent; reduction of Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) from 4 percent to 2 percent; reduction of 
liquidity ratio from 40 percent to 30 percent; approval of report of transactions against eligible securities for 90 days, 
180 days and 360 days; CBN to buy and sell securities through the two-way quotes; and directive to banks to 
restructure margin loans up to 2009. The NSE on its part emphasized strict enforcement of NSE’s listing 
requirements with zero tolerance for infraction. It also took administrative actions to stem the rate of new listings 
until the market stabilize. Furthermore, the NSE reviewed its policy on share price movements by placing a one 
percent benchmark on share price depreciation in the exchange. It was considered as part of the measures put by the 
federal government’s committee to halt the financial meltdown in the market. Under the new dispensation share price 
could appreciate by a maximum of five percent but could only depreciate by a maximum of one percent. The 
mechanism served the intention of slowing down share price depreciation. 
The direct implications of all these decisions are as follows. First, the Central Bank’s liquidity provision is to avail 
investors of opportunities in acquiring stocks with strong growth potential but largely under-priced. Second, the 
various cuts in fees and transaction costs both by SEC and CBN were supposed to induce various investors and 
stakeholders to take more risks with minimum cost of capital. Third, selling pressure by most stock broking firms at 
lower prices in order to payback their loan facilities would be of no use due to the tenure restructuring of their 
facilities. Fourth, with such regulations imposed, including the delisting of moribund companies, several 
non-functional companies will be removed from the listed stocks. Fifth, with the strict control of stocks listing in the 
stock exchange, funds can now be channelled from the primary market to the secondary market. And finally, it is 
expected that investors’ confidence in the market will be restored as the market gradually rebounds. 
Conclusions 
It is mind puzzling that barely two years ago(2006-2008), Nigeria was the main investment destination in Africa, and 
then suddenly, we are experiencing a shortage of liquidity, flight of foreign funds, deteriorating capital market, 
depleting reserves and a depreciating currency. The public’s perception over the ongoing financial crisis is that it was 
unforeseen and further aggravated by the global crisis. Over the years, there have been countless economic theories, 
aimed at explaining the causes and signs of an impending financial crisis. The truth is, when studied, all crises emit 
warning signs, which are either overlooked by supervisory bodies (Central Bank of Nigeria, Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange), or tackled too late. 
In the aftermath of bank consolidation, Nigeria experienced a high influx of Foreign Direct Investment (from 
$4,978m in 2005 to $12,454m in 2007), coupled with increased oil revenues (price per barrel hit a high of $147.27 in 
July 2008, growing the reserves to $64.85bn in August 2008). These indicated that Nigeria was indeed ready and 
capable of absorbing large foreign investments. The hype was also shared by banks and investors domestically. As a 
result of recapitalization, the banks were able to be more creative and offer more products to customers. While this 
signalled the strength and liquidity of the banks, the process of financial innovation shifted the system as a whole, 
towards the verge of collapse. It is important to point out that the problem is not strictly confined to the financial 
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products, but the regulations guiding the use of these products. About the same period of economic expansion, the 
Nigerian capital market began to thrive. The market-experienced record listing of IPO’s and capitalization rocketed 
(from N4trn in 2006, to a peak of N12.64trn in March, 2008). In the bid to tap into this money-well, banks became 
more creative and developed, which enabled them to tap into this risk. The term “Margin Finance Facility” (MFF) is 
one most of us are now familiar with. The banks got caught up in the frenzy, disbursing MFF’s with insufficient 
collateral and little or no customer credit information. Like Minsky’s(1974) theory articulates, a state of euphoria 
emerged between 2006 and 2008; the level of loans disbursed by the now stronger banks, amounted to record 
figures. These loans were disbursed on the basis that the customers expected profits (stock value) would appreciate 
and refinancing could be obtained to service their debt. The Minsky’s(1974) “Financial Instability Hypothesis”- 
Ponzi Finance, stipulates a form of finance, in which new debts are used to finance old debts (rob-Peter-pay-Paul, 
principle).  
According to this theory, it is “the deterioration in the quality of the debt over the life of the boom that creates the 
inevitability of a bust”. In other words, “stability is paradoxically destabilizing: good times create a state of euphoria, 
encouraging experimentation and excessive risk taking, resulting in a bust”. He further argues that, “financial 
innovation leads to a high level of financial instability and fragility”, paving the way for a crisis. The theory entails 
three categories of debt structures, which every reasonably advanced financial system goes through, in tandem with 
the business cycle. The first is Hedge Finance, which is experienced after a recession, where banks have lost money 
and thus, lend cautiously (loans equals cash flow). As the economy grows, banks appetite for risk increases and they 
engage in riskier lending. This is referred to as Speculative Finance. The banks lend on the assumption that 
customers asset value (stocks) appreciate and from this, able to either repay their loans or refinance. This leads to the 
final stage before a crisis, referred to as Ponzi Finance, where new debt is obtained to settle old debts. At this point, 
large amount of risky debts has been absorbed by the economy and the system become vulnerable to a shock in the 
banking system. In such a scenario, banks identify the risk, and stop issuing loan and as a result, customers will 
either have to refinance or sell assets to settle debt. The problem is, the more assets sold, prices begin to drop, up to a 
point where debt is greater than asset value and defaults become inevitable. This is exactly what happened in 
Nigeria.   
The rapid growth of the capital market which was fuelled by debt, structured by banks, created a fragile financial 
system. The highly leveraged market became susceptible to a collapse in the event of a liquidity crunch, which later 
occurred. There is still a bit of uncertainty as to why the market capitalization dipped in June, 2008 to N10trn. Some 
argue that it is as a result of the global financial crisis, which caused a flight of foreign funds from the market. 
Whatever the conclusion may be, it is certain that, due to the exposure of some banks to the declining assets and 
announcements by CBN and SEC on new regulations, a panic developed, trust diminished and banks began to hoard 
money. At this point, it became impossible for borrowers to obtain fresh loans or refinancing. This led to an asset 
(stock) sell-off to service existing debt, which resulted in sharp declines in stock prices and inevitably, defaults. This 
is sort of a vicious circle.  
The validity of the theory is evident by the financial crisis contagion, which started in the US and handicapped the 
global financial systems. The US crisis did not happen overnight; the problem started in the 1970’s, when Alan 
Greenspan was still the chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board. In a bid to counter inflation and re-energise the 
US economy, Greenspan resorted to monetarist strategies, which effectively squeezed money out of the system. In an 
attempt to create credit, financial innovation surfaced and US firms began to use assets such as commercial papers as 
collateral, to securitize. The banks soon took advantage of this and became more innovative, developing products 
such as Collaterised Debt Obligations (CDO’s) and Assets Backed Securities (ABS). The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) failed to identify the threat and allowed securitized products to grow. It was the 
decline in the quality of these CDO’s underlying assets (mortgaged-houses), which sparked the current credit crunch 
in the US and Europe, with the effects being felt globally. It is a known fact that any bubble will bust, but the effects 
of the bust were enhanced by the failure of the financial regulators to monitor and regulate the market. 
Similarly, the Nigerian economy is in desperate need of a lifeline. The foreign exchange market has gone belly-up, 
the stock market has lost more than half its value (from a peak of N12.64trn in March 2008, to a low of N4.6trn in 
March 2009) and the banking sector is in a desperate state. The authorities are partly to blame for the current crisis, 
which according to the theory was unavoidable. It is simply a case of by how much they could have reduced the 
length and severity of the crisis. 
Take a minute to think and absorb the fact that all economies with a reasonably developed banking sector and capital 
market, has at some point experienced a crisis. If carefully observed, one will notice that after a recession, banks 
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become more cautious in lending (hedge finance), as seen in Japan after the market crash in the early 90’s. As the 
economy begins to grow, the risk appetite of banks also grows and they begin to lend out to riskier customers 
(Speculative finance, which leads to Ponzi finance).  
This is precisely what happened in Nigeria. Following a long period of military rule and unhealthy financial 
institutions, the banks recapitalized, the economy grew and banks disbursed loans recklessly to borrowers who 
previously had no access to such credit, fuelling the capital market expansion. This is where the authorities failed. 
The CBN and SEC could have reduced the effects of the inevitable bust, by increasing bank supervision and 
tightening regulations. Evidence based on research on the Nigerian Inter-Bank Lending rate (NIBOR), as well as 
banks balance sheets, strengthens these claims. The figures suggest that; prior to capitalisation, NIBOR was 
relatively high, but after recapitalization, this rate dropped considerably until late 2008, when the credit crunch hit 
and rates began to rise (rates hit the 30% mark in February, 2009). The banks balance sheets also suggest that loan 
disbursement prior to recapitalization was low, compare to a 150% increase within a year of recapitalizing. This 
should have served as a guide to the supervisory bodies, who appear to have taken their minds off issues that 
mattered. The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) is also to blame, as they should have carried out adequate research on 
the major funding sources of the stock market. It is a known fact that borrowed money, invested in stocks is 
averagely short-term and is vulnerable to shocks in the banking system. This crisis should serve as a lesson to the 
CBN, NSE and SEC, in understanding that a bust cannot be avoided, but the effects can be mitigated, with tighter 
controls and closer supervision. 
 
Finally, the current meltdown of the Nigerian capital market has provided excellent opportunities for both local and 
foreign investors to grab the shares at rock-bottom prices with the greed of a hungry lion. There appears to be no 
better time to buy the shares in the Nigerian capital market than now. The fundamental of the Nigerian capital market 
are still very strong-high earnings per share, high dividends per share, high earning yields, high dividend yields, good 
bonuses and low price-earnings ratios. With the complete internationalization of the Nigerian capital market and the 
planned demutualization of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, foreign investors can acquire up to 100% of Nigeria 
companies and exercise full control. It is believed that the acquisition opportunities offered to investors now by the 
current capital market meltdown in Nigerian can only be exploited now for bountiful future gain. 
 
References 
Agrawal, A and Tandon, K. (1994),  “Anomalies or Illusions?’’ Evidence from Stock Markets in Eighteen 
Countries”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 13, 83-106. 
Ariel, R. A. (1987) “A monthly Effect in Stock Return”, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 18, 161-174 
Ball, R. J. and Brown, P. (1968),  ‘An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers’ Journal of 
Accounting Research, vol.16, 159-178. 
Banz, R. (1981), “The Relationship between Return and Market Value of Common Stock”  Journal of Financial 
Economics, March, 3 –18. 
Basu, Sanjoy (1977), “Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to their Price-Earnings Ratios: A Test 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis,” Journal of Finance 32, 663-82. 
Bell, E. B. (1974) “The Relation of the Structure of Common Stock prices to Historical Expenditional and Industrial 
Variables”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. XXIX (March0 No.1, 187-215. 
Bhardwaj. R.K., and Brooks, L.D. (1992), “The January Anomaly: Effects of Low Share Price, Transaction Costs, 
and Bid-Ask Bias” Journal of Finance 47, January, 553 – 575. 
Black Fischer (1986), ‘Noise’ Journal of Finance, Vol.41, 529-543. 
Brennan, M. J. and Subvahmanya, A. (1995) “Investment Analysis and Adjustment of Stock Prices to Common 
Information”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol.6, 799-824. 
Brockman, P. and Michayluk, D. (1998), “The Persistent Holiday Effective: Addition Evidence, Applied Economic 
Letters 5, 205-209. 
Buckner, A.W. (1972) “An Inter-Temporal Approach to the Optimization of Dividend Policy with Predetermined 
Investments”, Journal of Finance, Vol. XXVII (June), 627-635. 
Cadsby, B. and Ratner, M. (1992), ‘Turn of the Month and Pre-holiday Effect on Stock Returns: Some International 
Evidence’ Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 497-509. 
Campbell,  J. Y. and Shiller, R. J. (1988), ‘Cointegration and Tests of Present Value Models’ Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol.95, 1062-1088. 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                   www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.9, 2012  
 
116 
Chae, J. (2005), “Trading Volume, Information Asymmetry, and Timing Information”, Journal of Finance, Vol.60 
No. 1, 413-442. 
Chug, K. H., Mcluish, T. H., Wood, R. A. and Wyhowski, D. J. (1995), “Production of Information, Information 
Asymmetry and the bid-ask Spread: empirical Evidence from Analysis Forecasts” Journal of Banking and Finance 
Vol.19, 1025-1046. 
Cochrane, J. H. (1991), “Volatility Tests and Efficient Market: A Review Essay” Journal of Monetary Economics 
Vol.27, 463-485. 
Cutler, D. M., Poterba, M. and Summers, L. H. (1989), ‘What moves stock prices’ Journal of portfolio Management, 
Vol. 15, 4-12. 
De Bondt, Werner F., and Richard H. Thaler (1985), “Does the Stock Market Overreact”. Journal of Finance, July 
793-805. 
DeBondt, Werner and Thaler, Richard (1987),  “Further Evidence of Investor Overreaction and Stock-Market 
Seasonality” Journal of Finance, 42, 557-81. 
DeBondt, W.E.M. and R. H. Thaler (1987) “Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market 
Seasonality”, Journal of Finance, Vol.47, 427-465. 
Dechow, Patricia M., Hutton, Amy P., Sloan, Richard G. (1999), “An Empirical Assessment of the Residual Income 
Valuation model” Journal of Accounting and Economics Vol. 26, 1-34.  
Fama, Eugene F. (1991) “Efficient Capital Markets II’’ Journal of Finance, December, 1575-1617. 
Fama E.F. (1970), ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of Finance 25 
(May 1970), 383 417.  
Fama E.F. (1965), “The Behaviour of Stock Market Prices,” Journal of Business 38, January,  34-105. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1995), ‘Size and Book-to-market factors in earnings and returns’ Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 50, 131-155. 
Fama, Eugene F., Fisher, Lawrence; Jensen, Michael and Roll, Richard (1969), “The Adjustment of stock prices to 
new Information” International Economic Review, Vol.10, No.1(February), 1-21. 
Fisher, R. G. (1961),  “Some Factors Influencing Share Prices”, The Economic Journal, 120. 
French Kenneth R. (1980), “Risk, Return and Equilibrium”, Journal of Political Economy 79 (January/February 
1971): 30-55. 
Gosnell, T. F., Keown, A. J., Pinkerton, J. M. (1996), ‘The Intraday Speed of Stock Price Adjustment to Major 
Dividend Changes: Bid-Ask Bounce and Order Flow Imbalances’ Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.20, 247-266. 
Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2001), ‘How Distance, Language, and Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades’ 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, 1053-1073. 
Haris,  L. and Gurel,  H. (1986), ‘Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 List: New 
Evidence for the existence of Price Pressure’ Journal of Finance, Vol.41, 815-829. 
Harvey C.R. (1991), ‘The World Price of Covariance Risk’ Journal of Finance, vol.46, 815-829. 
Haugen, Robert A. and Baker, N. L. (1996), ‘Commonality in the Determinants of expected stock returns’ Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol.41, 401-439. 
Haugen, Robert and Lakonishok, Josef (1989), ‘The Incredible January Effect’ Homewood IL: Dow Jones Irwin. 
Hirshleifer, D. and Shumway, T. (2001), ‘Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Wealth’ SSRN Working 
Paper, Journal of Finance. 
Huberman and Regeve (2001), ‘Contagious Speculation and a Cure for Cancer: A non-event that made stock prices 
soar’, Journal of Finance, vol.56, 387-396. 
Ikpang Jacob (2008), Nigerian Capital Market in 2008 and outlook for 2009, Thisday, Thursday, 01 January 2009, 
p.10.  
Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. S. (1983), ‘The Market Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence’ Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol.11, 5-50. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1986), ‘Choices, Values, and Frames’ American Psychologist, 341-350. 
Keynes John Maynards (1936), “The General Theory of Employment’ London,  Macmillan. 
Klein A. (1986), ‘The Timing and Substance of Divestiture announcements: Individual, Simultaneous and 
Cumulative Effects’ Journal of Finance, vol.41, 685-696. 
Lakonishok, Josef and Maberly, Edwin (1990), “The Weekend Effect: Trading Patterns of Individual and 
Institutional Investors”, Journal of Finance 45, March, 231-243 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                   www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol 2, No.9, 2012  
 
117 
LeRoy S.F. and Porter R.D. (1981), “The Present Value relation: Tests based or Implied variance bonds’ 
Econometrica, Vol.49, 555-574. 
Mankiv, N. G., Romer, D., Shapiro, M. D. (1985),  ‘An Unbiased re-examination of Stock Market Volatility’ 
Journal of Finance, Vol.40, 677-687. 
Marsh, T.A. and Merton, R.C. (1987),  “Dividend Behaviour for aggregate Stock Markets”, Journal of Business, 
Vol.60, 1-40. 
McConnell,  J. J. and Muscarella, C. J. (1985), “Corporate Capital expenditure decisions and the market Value of 
the Firm” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.14, 399-422. 
Olisaemeka, A.G.(2009), The Meltdown of the Nigerian capital market: causes and consequences, ThisDay, March 
01,2009 
Patell, J. and Wolfson, M. (1984), ‘The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend 
Announcements’ Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.13, 223-252. 
Rabin, M. and Thaler, R. H. (2001), Anomalies: Risk Aversion’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.15, 
219-232.” 
Reinganum, Mark  R. (1983), ‘Portfolio Strategies for Small Caps Vs Large’ Journal of Portfolio Management. 
Winter 29-36 
Rozett, Michael S. and Kinney,  Williams R. (1976), “Capital Market Seasonality: The Case of Stock Returns” 
Journal of Financial Economics 3, 378-402. 
Schwert, G.W. (1989),  “Why Does Stock Volatility Change Over Time?” Journal of Finance, Vol-44, No.5 
(December), 1115-1153. 
Seyhun N. (1990), Overreaction of Fundamentals: Some Lessons From Insiders” Response to the market Crash of 
1987’Journal of Finance, Vol.45, 1363-1388. 
Seyhun N. (1986), Insiders’ Profits, Cost of Trading and market Efficient’ Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.16, 
189-212. 
Shiller, R.J. (1981) “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Change in Dividend?”, 
American Economic Review, Vol.71, pp.421-436. 
West K.D. (1988), ‘Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility’ Econometrica, Vol.56, 37-61. 
*** All Share Index (ASI) is a measure of the magnitude and direction of general price movement in Nigerian Stock 
market.  
This academic article was published by The International Institute for Science, 
Technology and Education (IISTE).  The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open Access 
Publishing service based in the U.S. and Europe.  The aim of the institute is 
Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the publisher can be found in the IISTE’s homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
The IISTE is currently hosting more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals and 
collaborating with academic institutions around the world.  There’s no deadline for 
submission.  Prospective authors of IISTE journals can find the submission 
instruction on the following page: http://www.iiste.org/Journals/ 
The IISTE editorial team promises to the review and publish all the qualified 
submissions in a fast manner. All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than 
those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Printed version of the 
journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
